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Abstract. We present a new, distributed method to compute approx-
imate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous ap-
proaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for
example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs),
our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived
from one of the two payoff matrices, and then compute approximate Nash
equilibria using only limited communication between the players.
Our method has several applications for improved bounds for efficient
computations of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. First, it
yields a best polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate well-
supported Nash equilibria (WSNE), which guarantees to find a 0.6528-
WSNE in polynomial time. Furthermore, since our algorithm solves the
two LPs separately, it can be used to improve upon the best known al-
gorithms in the limited communication setting: the algorithm can be im-
plemented to obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm
that uses poly-logarithmic communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE.
The algorithm can also be carried out to beat the best known bound
in the query complexity setting, requiring O(n log n) payoff queries to
compute a 0.6528-WSNE. Finally, our approach can also be adapted to
provide the best known communication efficient algorithm for computing
approximate Nash equilibria: it uses poly-logarithmic communication to
find a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The problem of finding equilibria in non-cooperative games is a central problem
in modern game theory. Nash’s seminal theorem proved that every finite normal-
form game has at least one Nash equilibrium [15], and this raises the natural
question of whether we can find one efficiently. After several years of extensive
research, this study has culminated in a proof that finding a Nash equilibrium is
PPAD-complete [4] even for two-player bimatrix games [2], which is considered to
be strong evidence that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for this problem.
Approximate equilibria. The fact that computing an exact Nash equilibrium
of a bimatrix game is unlikely to be tractable, has led to the study of approximate
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Nash equilibria. There are in fact two notions of approximate equilibrium, both
of which will be studied in this paper. An ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE)
is a pair of strategies in which neither player can increase their expected payoff
by more than ǫ by deviating from their assigned strategy. An ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) is a pair of strategies in which both players only
place probability on strategies whose payoff is within ǫ of the best response
payoff. Every ǫ-WSNE is an ǫ-NE, but the converse does not hold, so a WSNE
is a more restrictive notion.
Approximate Nash equilibria are the more well studied of two concepts. A
line of work has studied the best guarantee that can be achieved in polynomial
time [1,5,6], and the best algorithm known so far is the gradient descent method
of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [16] that finds a 0.3393-NE in polynomial time. On
the other hand, progress on computing approximate-well-supported Nash equi-
libria has been less forthcoming. The first correct algorithm was provided by
Kontogiannis and Spirakis [14] (which shall henceforth be referred to as the
KS algorithm), who gave a polynomial time algorithm for finding a 23 -WSNE.
This was later slightly improved by Fearnley, Goldberg, Savani, and Sørensen [8]
(whose algorithm we shall refer to as the FGSS-algorithm), who showed that the
WSNEs provided by the KS algorithm could be improved, and this yields a poly-
nomial time algorithm for finding a 0.6608-WSNE; this is the best approximation
guarantee for WSNEs that is currently known.
Communication complexity. Approximate Nash equilibria can also be stud-
ied from the communication complexity point of view, which captures the amount
of communication the players need to find a good approximate Nash equilibrium.
It models a natural scenario where the two players each know their own payoff
matrix, but do not know their opponents payoff matrix. The players must then
follow a communication protocol that eventually produces strategies for both
players. The goal is to design a protocol that produces a sufficiently good ǫ-NE
or ǫ-WSNE while also minimizing the amount of communication between the
two players.
Communication complexity of equilibria in games has been studied in pre-
vious works [3, 13]. The recent paper of Goldberg and Pastink [11] initiated the
study of communication complexity in the bimatrix game setting. There they
showed Θ(n2) communication is required to find an exact Nash equilibrium of
an n × n bimatrix game. Since these games have Θ(n2) payoffs in total, this
implies that there is no communication efficient protocol for finding exact Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games. For approximate equilibria, they showed that one
can find a 34 -Nash equilibrium without any communication, and that in the no-
communication setting, finding an 12 -Nash equilibrium is impossible. Motivated
by these positive and negative results, they focused on the most interesting
setting, which allows only a polylogarithmic (in n) amount of communication
(number of bits) between the players. They demonstrated that one can compute
0.438-Nash equilibria and 0.732-well-supported Nash equilibria in this setting.
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Query complexity. The payoff query model is motivated by practical appli-
cations of game theory. It is often the case that we know that there is a game
to be solved, but we do not know what the payoffs are, and in order to discover
the payoffs, we would have to play the game. This may be quite costly, so it is
natural to ask whether we can find an equilibrium of a game while minimising
the number of experiments that we must perform.
Payoff queries model this situation. In the payoff query model we are told
the structure of the game, ie. the strategy space, but we are not told the payoffs.
We can then make payoff queries, where we propose a pure strategy profile, and
we are told the payoff to each player under that strategy profile. Our task is
to compute an equilibrium of the game while minimising the number of payoff
queries that we make.
The study of query complexity in bimatrix games was initiated by Fearnley
et al. [7], who gave a deterministic algorithm for finding a 12 -NE using 2n − 1
payoff queries. A subsequent paper of Fearnley and Savani [9] showed a number
of further results. Firstly, they showed a Ω(n2) lower bound on the query com-
plexity of finding an ǫ-NE with ǫ < 12 , which combined with the result above,
gives a complete view of the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games. They then give a randomized algorithm that finds
a (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-NE using O(
n·log n
ǫ2 ) queries, and a randomized algorithm that finds
a (23 + ǫ)-WSNE using O(
n·log n
ǫ4 ) queries.
Our contribution. In this paper we introduce a distributed technique that
allows us to efficiently compute approximate Nash equilibria and approximate
well-supported Nash equilibria using limited communication between the players.
Traditional methods for computing WSNEs have used an LP based approach
that, when used on a bimatrix game (R,C), solve the zero-sum game (R−C,C−
R). The KS algorithm [14] showed that if there is no pure 23 -WSNE, then the
solution to the zero-sum game is a 23 -WSNE. The slight improvement of the
FGSS-algorithm [8] to 0.6608 was obtained by adding two further methods to
the KS algorithm: if the KS algorithm does not produce a 0.6608-WSNE, then
either there is a 2 × 2 matching pennies sub-game that is 0.6608-WSNE or the
strategies from the zero-sum game can be improved by shifting the probabilities
of both players within their supports in order to produce a 0.6608-WSNE.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We first show that the bound
of 23 can be matched using a pair of distributed LPs. Given a bimatrix game
(R,C), we solve the two zero-sum games (R,−R), and (−C,C), and we give
a straightforward procedure that we call the base algorithm, which uses the
solutions to these games to produce a 23 -WSNE of (R,C). Goldberg and Pastink
[11] also considered this pair of LPs, but their algorithm only produces a 0.732-
WSNE. We then show that the base algorithm can be improved by applying
the probability-shifting and matching-pennies ideas from the FGSS-algorithm.
That is, if the base algorithm fails to find a 0.6528-WSNE, then a 0.6528-WSNE
can be obtained either by shifting the probabilities of one of the two players,
or by identifying a 2 × 2 sub-game. This gives a polynomial-time algorithm
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that computes a 0.6528-WSNE, which provides the best known approximate
guarantees for WSNEs (Theorem 2).
It is worth pointing out that, while these techniques are thematically similar
to the ones used by the FGSS-algorithm, the actual implementation is signif-
icantly different. The FGSS-algorithm attempts to improve the strategies by
shifting probabilities within the supports of the strategies returned by the two
player game, with the goal of reducing the other player’s payoff. In our algorithm,
we shift probabilities away from bad strategies in order to improve that player’s
payoff. This type of analysis is possible because the base algorithm produces
a strategy profile in which one of the two players plays a pure strategy, which
makes the analysis we need to carry out much simpler. On the other hand, the
KS-algorithm can produce strategies in which both players play many strategies,
and so the analysis used for the FGSS-algorithm is necessarily more complicated.
Since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve
the upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting. This
is because no communication is required for the row player to solve (R,−R),
and the column player to solve (−C,C). The players can then carry out the rest
of the algorithm using only poly-logarithmic communication. Hence, we obtain
a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic
communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE (Theorem 3). Moreover, the base al-
gorithm can be implemented as a communication efficient algorithm for finding
a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE in a win-lose bimatrix game, where all payoffs are either 0
or 1 (Theorem 1).
The algorithm can also used to beat the best known bound in the query
complexity setting. It has already been shown by Goldberg and Roth [12] that
an ǫ-NE of a zero-sum game can be found by a randomized algorithm that uses
O(n log nǫ2 ) payoff queries. Since rest of the steps used by our algorithm can also
be carried out using O(n log n) payoff queries, this gives us a query efficient
algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE (Theorem 4).
We also show that the base algorithm can be adapted to find a 3−
√
5
2 -NE in
a bimatrix game, which matches the bound given for the first algorithm of Bosse
et al. [1]. Once again, this can be implemented in a communication efficient
manner, and so we obtain an algorithm that computes a (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-NE (i.e.,
0.382-NE) using only poly-logarithmic communication (Theorem 5).
2 Preliminaries
Bimatrix games. Throughout the paper, we use [n] to denote the set of integers
{1, 2, . . . , n}. An n× n bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two n× n matrices: R
gives payoffs for the row player, and C gives the payoffs for the column player.
We make the standard assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. We also
assume that each payoff has constant bit-length. A win-lose bimatrix game is a
game in which all payoffs are either 0 or 1.
Each player has n pure strategies. To play the game, both players simultane-
ously select a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the column
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player selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives payoff Ri,j , and
the column player receives payoff Ci,j .
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n]. We denote a mixed
strategy for the row player as a vector x of length n, such that xi is the prob-
ability that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of the
column player is a vector y of length n, with the same interpretation. Given a
mixed strategy x for either player, the support of x is the set of pure strategies i
with xi > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row and the column player,
respectively, then we call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile. The expected payoff for
the row player under strategy profile (x,y) is given by xTRy and for the column
player by xTCy. We denote the support of a strategy x as supp(x), which gives
the set of pure strategies i such that xi > 0.
Nash equilibria. Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player. The set of
pure best responses against y for the row player is the set of pure strategies that
maximize the payoff against y. More formally, a pure strategy i ∈ [n] is a best
response against y if, for all pure strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have: ∑j∈[n] yj · Ri,j ≥∑
j∈[n] yj ·Ri′,j . Column player best responses are defined analogously.
A mixed strategy profile (x,y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if every pure
strategy in supp(x) is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in
supp(y) is a best response against x. Nash [15] showed that all bimatrix games
have a mixed Nash equilibrium. Observe that in a Nash equilibrium, each player’s
expected payoff is equal to their best response payoff.
Approximate Equilibria. There are two commonly studied notions of approx-
imate equilibrium, and we consider both of them in this paper. The first notion
is of an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE), which weakens the requirement
that a player’s expected payoff should be equal to their best response payoff.
Formally, given a strategy profile (x,y), we define the regret suffered by the
row player to be the difference between the best response payoff, and the actual
payoff:
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− xT · R · y.
Regret for the column player is defined analogously. We have that (x,y) is an
ǫ-NE if and only if both players have regret less than or equal to ǫ.
The other notion is of an ǫ-approximate-well-supported equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE),
which weakens the requirement that players only place probability on best re-
sponse strategies. Given a strategy profile (x,y) and a pure strategy j ∈ [n], we
say that j is an ǫ-best-response for the row player if:
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− (R · y)j ≤ ǫ.
An ǫ-WSNE requires that both players only place probability on ǫ-best-responses.
Formally, the row player’s pure strategy regret under (x,y) is defined to be:
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− min
i∈supp(x)
(
(R · y)i
)
.
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Pure strategy regret for the column player is defined analogously. A strategy
profile (x,y) is an ǫ-WSNE if both players have pure strategy regret less than
or equal to ǫ.
Communication complexity. We consider the communication model for bi-
matrix games introduced by Goldberg and Pastink [11]. In this model, both
players know the payoffs in their own payoff matrix, but do not know the pay-
offs in their opponent’s matrix. The players then follow an algorithm that uses
a number of communication rounds, where in each round they exchange a single
bit of information. Between each communication round, the players are permit-
ted to perform arbitrary randomized computations (although it should be noted
that, in this paper, the players will only perform polynomial-time computations)
using their payoff matrix, and the bits that they have received so far. At the end
of the algorithm, the row player outputs a mixed strategy x, and the column
player outputs a mixed strategy y.
The goal is to produce a strategy profile (x,y) that is an ǫ-NE or ǫ-WSNE for
a sufficiently small ǫ while limiting the number of communication rounds used
by the algorithm. The algorithms given in this paper will use at most O(log2 n)
communication rounds. In order to achieve this, we use the following result of
Goldberg and Pastink [11].
Lemma 1 ( [11]). Given a mixed strategy x for the row-player and an ǫ > 0,
there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses O( log
2 n
ǫ2 )-
communication to transmit a strategy xs to the column player where |supp(xs)| ∈
O( log nǫ2 ) and for every strategy i ∈ [n] we have:
|(xT · R)i − (xTs · R)i| ≤ ǫ.
The algorithm uses the well-known sampling technique of Lipton, Markakis, and
Mehta to construct the strategy xs, so for this reason we will call the strategy
xs the sampled strategy from x. Since this strategy has a logarithmically sized
support, it can be transmitted by sendingO( log nǫ2 ) strategy indexes, each of which
can be represented using logn bits. By symmetry, the algorithm can obviously
also be used to transmit approximations of column player strategies to the row
player.
Query complexity. In the query complexity setting, the algorithm knows that
the players will play an n×n game (R,C), but it does not know any of the entries
of R or C. These payoffs are obtained using payoff queries in which the algorithm
proposes a pure strategy profile (i, j), and then it is told the value of Rij and
Cij . After each payoff query, the algorithm can make arbitrary computations
(although, again, in this paper the algorithms that we consider take polynomial
time) in order to decide the next pure strategy profile to query. After making a
sequence of payoff queries, the algorithm then outputs a mixed strategy profile
(x,y). Again, the goal is to ensure that this strategy profile is an ǫ-NE or ǫ-
WSNE, while minimizing the number of queries made overall.
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There are two results that we will use for this setting. Goldberg and Roth [10]
have given a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds an ǫ-NE of
a zero-sum game using O(n·log nǫ2 ) payoff queries. Given a mixed strategy profile
(x,y), an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the row player is a vector v such that,
for all i ∈ [n] we have |vi − (R · y)i| ≤ ǫ. Approximate payoff vectors for the
column player are defined symmetrically. Fearnley and Savani [9] observed that
there is a randomized algorithm that when given the strategy profile (x,y),
finds approximate payoff vectors for both players using O(n·log nǫ2 ) payoff queries
and that succeeds with high probability. We summarise these two results in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 ( [9, 10]). Given an n× n zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability
at least (1−n− 18 )(1− 2n )2, we can compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (x,y), and ǫ-
approximate payoff vectors for both players under (x,y), using O(n·log nǫ2 ) payoff
queries.
3 The base algorithm
In this section, we introduce an algorithm that we call the base algorithm. This
algorithm provides a simple way to find a 23 -WSNE. We present this algorithm
separately for three reasons. Firstly, we believe that the algorithm is interesting
in its own right, since it provides a relatively straightforward method for finding
a 23 -WSNE that is quite different from the technique used in the KS-algorithm.
Secondly, our algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE will replace the final step of
the algorithm with two more involved procedures, so it is worth understanding
this algorithm before we describe how it can be improved. Finally, at the end
of this section, we will show that this algorithm can be adapted to provide a
communication efficient way to find a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE in win-lose games.
The algorithm. Consider the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be the
value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality assume
that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 2/3, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj · x∗ ≤ 2/3, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
– Let j∗ be a pure best response to x∗.
– Find a row i such that Rij∗ > 1/3 and Cij∗ > 1/3.
– Return (i, j∗).
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We argue that this algorithm is correct. Firstly, we must prove that the row
i used in Step 4 actually exists, which we do in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If Algorithm 1 reaches Step 4, then there exists a row i such that
Rij∗ > 1/3 and Cij∗ > 1/3.
Proof. Let i be a row sampled from x∗. We will show that there is a positive
probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13 ) < 0.5. Let the
random variable T = 1 − Rij∗ . Since vr > 23 , we have that E[T ] < 13 . Thus,
applying Markov’s inequality we obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
) ≤ E[T ]
2/3
< 0.5.
Since Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13 ) = Pr(T ≥ 23 ) we can therefore conclude that Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13 ) <
0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(Cij∗ ≤ 13 ) < 0.5, by
using the fact that CTj∗ · x∗ > 23 .
We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 1
3
or Cij∗ ≤ 1
3
) < 1.
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies Rij∗ >
1
3 and Cij∗ >
1
3 ,
so such a row must exist. ⊓⊔
We now argue that the algorithm always produces a 23 -WSNE. There are
three possible strategy profiles that can be returned by the algorithm, which we
consider individually.
Step 2. Since vc ≤ vr by assumption, and since vr ≤ 23 , we have that (R ·y∗)i ≤
2
3 for every row i, and ((xˆ)
T · C)j ≤ 23 for every column j. So, both players
can have pure strategy regret at most 23 in (xˆ,y
∗), and thus this profile is a
2
3 -WSNE.
Step 3. Much like in the previous case, when the column player plays y∗, the
row player can have pure strategy regret at most 23 . The requirement that
CTj x
∗ ≤ 23 also ensures that the column player has pure strategy regret at
most 23 . Thus, we have that (x
∗,y∗) is a 23 -WSNE.
Step 4. Both players have payoff at least 13 under (i, j
∗) for the sole strategy
in their respective supports. Hence, the maximum pure strategy regret that
can be suffered by a player is 1− 13 = 23 .
Therefore, we have show that the algorithm always produces a 23 -WSNE.
Win-lose games. The base algorithm can be adapted to provide a communi-
cation efficient method for finding a (0.5+ ǫ)-WSNE in win-lose games. In brief,
the algorithm can be modified to find a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose game by making
Steps 2 and 3 check against the threshold of 0.5. It can then be shown that if
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these steps fail, then there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in column j∗. This
can then be implemented as a communication efficient protocol using the algo-
rithm from Lemma 1. Full details are given in Appendix A, where the following
theorem is proved.
Theorem 1. For every win-lose game and every ǫ > 0, there is a random-
ized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
ǫ2
)
communication and
finds a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE.
4 An algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE
In this section, we show how Algorithm 1 can be modified to produce a 0.6528-
WSNE. We begin by giving an overview of the techniques used, we then give the
algorithm, and finally we analyse the quality of WSNE that it produces.
Outline. The idea behind our algorithm is to replace Step 4 of Algorithm 1
with a more involved procedure. This procedure uses two techniques, that both
find an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 23 .
Firstly, we attempt to turn (x∗, j∗) into a WSNE by shifting probabilities.
Observe that, since j∗ is a best response, the column player has a pure strategy
regret of 0 in (x∗, j∗). On the other hand, we have no guarantees about the row
player since x∗ might place a small amount of probability strategies with payoff
strictly less than 13 . However, since x
∗ achieves a high expected payoff (due to
Step 2,) it cannot place too much probability on these low payoff strategies.
Thus, the idea is to shift the probability that x∗ assigns to entries of j∗ with
payoff less than or equal to 13 to entries with payoff strictly greater than
1
3 , and
thus ensure that the row player’s pure strategy regret is below 23 . Of course,
this procedure will increase the pure strategy regret of the column player, but if
it is also below 23 once all probability has been shifted, then we have found an
ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 23 .
If shifting probabilities fails to find an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 23 , then we show
that the game contains a matching pennies sub-game. More precisely, we show
that there exists a column j′, and rows b and s such that the 2 × 2 sub-game
induced by j∗, j′, b, and s has the following form:
❅
❅
I
II
b
s
j∗ j′
≈ 1 0
0 ≈ 1
0 ≈ 1
≈ 1 0
Thus, if both players play uniformly over their respective pair of strategies, then
j∗, j′, b, and s with have payoff ≈ 0.5, and so this yields an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 23 .
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The algorithm. We now formalize this approach, and show that it always finds
an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 23 . In order to quantify the precise ǫ that we obtain, we
parametrise the algorithm by a variable z, which we constrain to be in the range
0 ≤ z < 124 . With the exception of the matching pennies step, all other steps
of the algorithm will return a (23 − z)-WSNE, while the matching pennies step
will return a (12 + f(z))-WSNE for some increasing function f . Optimizing the
trade off between 23 − z and 12 + f(z) then allows us to determine the quality of
WSNE found by our algorithm.
The algorithm is displayed as Algorithm 2. Observe that Steps 1, 2, and 3 are
versions of the corresponding steps from Algorithm 1, which have been adapted
to produce a (23 − z)-WSNE. Step 4 implements the probability shifting proce-
dure, while Step 5 finds a matching pennies sub-game.
Observe that the probabilities used in xmp and ymp are only well defined
when z ≤ 124 , because we have that 1−15z2−39z > 1 whenever z > 124 , which explains
our required upper bound on z.
The correctness of Step 5. This step of the algorithm relies on the existence
of the rows b and s, which is not at all trivial. This is shown in the following
lemma. The proof of this lemma is quite lengthy, and is given in full detail in
Appendix B.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the following three conditions hold:
1. x∗ has payoff at least 23 − z against j∗.
2. j∗ has payoff at least 23 − z against x∗.
3. x∗ has payoff at least 23 − z against j′.
4. Neither j∗ or j′ contains a pure (23 − z)-WSNE (i, j) with i ∈ supp(x∗).
Then, both of the following are true:
– There exists a row b ∈ B such that Rbj∗ > 1− 18z1+3z and Cbj′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
– There exists a row s ∈ S such that Csj∗ > 1− 27z1+3z and Rsj′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
The lemma explicitly states the preconditions that need to hold because we
will reuse it in our communication complexity and query complexity results.
Observe that the preconditions are indeed true if the Algorithm reaches Step 5.
The first and third conditions hold because, due to Step 2, we know that x∗ is a
min-max strategy that secures payoff at least vr >
2
3 − z. The second condition
holds because Step 3 ensures that the column player’s best response payoff is at
least 23 −z. The fourth condition holds because Step 5 explicitly checks for these
pure strategy profiles.
Overview of the proof of Lemma 4. We now give an overview of the ideas
used in the proof. The majority of the proof is dedicated to proving four facts,
which we outline below. First we determine the structure of the row j∗. Here we
use the fact that in (x∗, j∗) both players have expected payoff close to 23 , but
there does not exist a row i ∈ supp(x∗) such that Rij∗ ≥ 13 + z and Cij∗ ≥ 13 + z
(because such a row would constitute a pure (23 − z)-WSNE.) The only way this
is possible is both of the following facts hold.
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Algorithm 2
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of (C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be the value
secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality assume that vc ≤
vr.
2. If vr ≤ 2/3 − z, then return (xˆ,y
∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj x
∗ ≤ 2/3− z, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
– Let j∗ be a pure best response against x∗. Define:
S := {i ∈ supp(x∗) : Rij∗ < 1/3 + z}
B := supp(x∗) \ S
– Define the strategy xb as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
(xb)i =
{
1
Pr(B)
· x∗i if i ∈ B
0 otherwise.
– If (xb
T · C)j∗ ≥
1
3
+ z, then return (xb, j
∗).
5. Otherwise:
– Let j′ be a pure best response against xb.
– If there exists an i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j∗) or (i, j′) is a pure
( 2
3
− z)-WSNE, then return it.
– Find a row b ∈ B such that Rbj∗ > 1−
18z
1+3z
and Cbj′ > 1−
18z
1+3z
.
– Find a row s ∈ S such that Csj∗ > 1−
27z
1+3z
and Rsj′ > 1−
27z
1+3z
.
– Define the row player strategy xmp and the column player strategy
ymp as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
xmpi =


1−24z
2−39z
if i = b,
1−15z
2−39z
if i = s,
0 otherwise.
ympi =


1−24z
2−39z
if i = j∗,
1−15z
2−39z
if i = j′,
0 otherwise.
– Return (xmp,ymp).
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1. Most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with Rij∗ ≈ 1 and
Cij∗ ≈ 13 .
2. Most of the probability assigned to S is placed on rows i with Rij∗ ≈ 13 and
Cij∗ ≈ 1.
Moreover, x∗ must assign roughly half of its probability to rows in B and half
of its probability to rows in S.
Next, we observe that since Step 4 failed to produce a (23−z)-WSNE, it must
be the case that j∗ is not a (23 − z)-best-response against xb, and the payoff of j∗
against xb is approximately
1
3 , it must be the case that the payoff of j
′ against
xb is close to 1. The only way this is possible is if most column player payoffs
for rows in B are close to 1. However, if this is the case, then since j∗ does not
contain a pure (23 − z)-WSNE, we have that most row player payoffs in B must
be below 13 + z. This gives us our third fact.
3. Most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with Rij′ <
1
3 + z
and Cij′ ≈ 1.
For the fourth fact, we recall that x∗ is a min-max strategy that guarantees
payoff at least vr >
2
3 − z, so the payoff of x∗ against j′ must be at least 23 − z.
However, since most rows i ∈ B have Rij′ < 13 + z, and since x∗ places roughly
half its probability on B, it must be the case that most row player payoffs in S
are close to 1. This gives us our final fact.
4. Most of the probability assigned to S is placed on rows i with Rij′ ≈ 1.
Our four facts only describe the expected payoff of the rows in B and S for
the columns j∗ and j′. The final step of the proof is to pick out two particular
rows that satisfy the desired properties. For the row b we use Facts 1 and 3,
observing that if most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with
Rij∗ ≈ 1, and on rows i with Cij∗ ≈ 1, then it must be the case that both of
these conditions can be simultaneously satisfied by a single row b. The existence
of s is proved by the same argument using Facts 2 and 4.
Quality of approximation. We now analyse the quality of WSNE that our
algorithm produces. Steps 2, 3, 4, 5 each return a strategy profile. Observe that
Steps 2 and 3 are the same as the respective steps in the base algorithm, but with
the threshold changed from 23 to
2
3 − z. Hence, we can use the same reasoning as
we gave for the base algorithm to argue that these steps always return (23 − z)-
WSNE. We now consider the other two steps.
Step 4. By definition all rows r ∈ B satisfy Rij∗ ≥ 13+z, so since supp(xb) ⊆ B,
the pure strategy regret of the row player can be at most 1− (13 +z) = 23 −z.
For the same reason, since (xb
T · C)j∗ ≥ 13 + z holds, the pure strategy
regret of the column player can also be at 23 − z. Thus, the profile (xb, j∗) is
a (23 − z)-WSNE.
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Step 5. Since Rbj∗ > 1 − 18z1+3z , the payoff of b when the column player plays
ymp is at least:
1− 24z
2− 39z ·
(
1− 18z
1 + 3z
)
=
1− 39z + 360z2
2− 33z − 117z2
Similarly, since Rsj′ > 1− 27z1+3z , the payoff of s when the column player plays
ymp is at least:
1− 15z
2− 39z ·
(
1− 27z
1 + 3z
)
=
1− 39z + 360z2
2− 33z − 117z2
In the same way, one can show that the payoffs of j∗ and j′ are also 1−39z+360z
2
2−33z−117z2
when the row player plays xmp. Thus, we have that (xmp,ymp) is a (1 −
1−39z+360z2
2−33z−117z2 )-WSNE.
To find the optimal value for z, we need to find the largest value of z for which
the following inequality holds.
1− 1− 39z + 360z
2
2− 33z − 117z2 ≤
2
3
− z.
Setting the inequality to an equality and rearranging gives the following cubic
polynomial equation.
117 z3 + 432 z2 − 30 z + 1
3
= 0.
Since the discriminant of this polynomial is positive, this polynomial has three
real roots, which can be found via the trigonometric method. Only one of these
roots lies in the range 0 ≤ z < 124 , which is the following:
z =
1
117
√
3
(√
2434
√
3 cos
(
1
3
arctan
(
39
240073
√
9749
√
3
))
− 3
√
2434 sin
(
1
3
arctan
(
39
240073
√
9749
√
3
))
− 48
√
3
)
.
Thus, we get z ≈ 0.013906376, and so we have found an algorithm that always
produces a 0.6528-WSNE. So we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a bimatrix game,
finds a 0.6528-WSNE.
Communication complexity. We claim that our algorithm can be adapted for
the limited communication setting. We make the following modification to our
algorithm. After computing x∗,y∗, xˆ, and yˆ, we then use Lemma 1 to construct
and communicate the sampled strategies x∗s ,y
∗
s , xˆs, and yˆs. These strategies are
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communicated between the two players using 4 · (log n)2 bits of communication,
and the players also exchange vr = (x
∗
s)
T · Ry∗s and vc = xˆTs Cyˆs using logn
rounds of communication. The algorithm then continues as before, except the
sampled strategies are used in place of their non-sampled counterparts. Finally,
in Steps 2 and 3, we test against the threshold 23 − z + ǫ instead of 23 − z.
Observe that, when sampled strategies are used, all steps of the algorithm can
be carried out in at most (logn)2 communication. In particular, to implement
Step 4, the column player can communicate j∗ to the row player, and then the
row player can communicate Rij∗ for all rows i ∈ supp(x∗s) using (logn)2 bits
of communication, which allows the column player to determine j′. Once j′ has
been determined, there are only 2 · logn payoffs in each matrix that are relevant
to the algorithm (the payoffs in rows i ∈ supp(x∗s) in columns j∗ and j′,) and so
the two players can communicate all of these payoffs to each other, and then no
further communication is necessary.
Now, we must argue that this modified algorithm is correct. Firstly, we argue
that if the modified algorithm reaches Step 5, then the rows b and s exist. To do
this, we observe that the required preconditions of Lemma 4 are satisfied by x∗s ,
j∗, and j′. Condition 2 holds because the modified Step 3 ensures that the column
player’s best response payoff is at least 23 − z + ǫ > 23 − z, while Condition 4
is ensured by the explicit check in Step 5. For Conditions 1 and 3, we use the
fact that (x∗,y∗) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game (R,−R). The
following lemma shows that any approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum
game behaves like an approximate min-max strategy.
Lemma 5. If (x,y) is an ǫ-NE of a zero-sum game (M,−M), then for every
strategy y′ we have:
xT ·M · y′ ≥ xT ·M · y − ǫ.
Proof. Let v = xT ·M ·y be the payoff to the row player under (x,y). Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a column player strategy y′ such
that:
xT ·M · y′ < v − ǫ.
Since the game is zero-sum, this implies that the column player’s payoff under
(x,y′) is strictly larger than −v + ǫ, which then directly implies that the best
response payoff for the column player against x is strictly larger than −v + ǫ.
However, since the column player’s expected payoff under (x,y) is −v, this then
implies that (x,y) is not an ǫ-NE, which provides our contradiction. ⊓⊔
Since Step 2 implies that the row player’s payoff in (x∗,y∗) is at least 23−z+ǫ,
Lemma 5 implies that x∗ secures a payoff of 23 − z no matter what strategy the
column player plays, which then implies that Conditions 1 and 3 of Lemma 4
hold.
Finally, we argue that the algorithm finds a (0.6528+ǫ). The modified Steps 2
and 3 now return a (23 − z + ǫ)-WSNE, whereas the approximation guarantees
of the other steps are unchanged. Thus, we can reuse our original analysis to
obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 3. For every ǫ > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time
algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
ǫ2
)
communication and finds a (0.6528 + ǫ)-WSNE.
Query complexity. We now show that Algorithm 2 can be implemented in a
payoff-query efficient manner. Let ǫ > 0 be a positive constant. We now outline
the changes needed in the algorithm.
– In Step 1 we use the algorithm of Lemma 2 to find ǫ2 -NEs of (R,−R),
and (C,−C). We denote the mixed strategies found as (x∗a,y∗a) and (xˆa, yˆa),
respectively, and we use these strategies in place of their original counterparts
throughout the rest of the algorithm. We also compute ǫ2 -approximate payoff
vectors for each of these strategies, and use them whenever we need to know
the payoff of a particular strategy under one of these strategies. In particular,
we set vr to be the payoff of x
∗
a according to the approximate payoff vector
of y∗a, and we set vc to be the payoff of yˆa according to the approximate
payoff vector for xˆa.
– In Steps 2 and 3 we test against the threshold of 23 − z+ ǫ rather than 23 − z.
– In Step 4 we select j∗ to be the column that is maximal in the approximate
payoff vector against x∗a. We then spend n payoff queries to query every row
in column j∗, which allow us to proceed with the rest of this step as before.
– In Step 5 we use the algorithm of Lemma 2 to find an approximate payoff
vector v for the column player against xb. We then select j
′ to be a column
that maximizes v, and then spend n payoff queries to query every row in j∗,
which allows us to proceed with the rest of this step as before.
Observe that the query complexity of the algorithm is O(n·log nǫ2 ), where the
dominating term arises due to the use of the algorithm from Lemma 2 to ap-
proximate solutions to the zero-sum games.
We now argue that this modified algorithm produces a (0.6528 + ǫ)-WSNE.
Firstly, we need to reestablish the existence of the rows b and s used in Step 5.
To do this, we observe that the preconditions of Lemma 4 hold for x∗a. We start
with Conditions 1 and 3. Note that the payoff for the row player under (x∗a,y
∗
a)
is at least vr − ǫ2 (since vr was estimated with approximate payoff vectors,)
and Step 2 ensures that vr >
2
3 − z + ǫ. Hence, we can apply Lemma 5 to
argue that x∗a secures payoff at least
2
3 − z against every strategy of the column
player, which proves that Conditions 1 and 3 hold. Condition 2 holds because
the check in Step 3, ensures that the approximate payoff of j∗ against x∗ is at
least 23 − z + ǫ, and therefore the actual payoff of of j∗ against x∗ is at least
2
3 − z + ǫ2 . Finally, Condition 4 holds because pure strategy profiles of this form
are explicitly checked for in Step 5.
Steps 2 and 3 in the modified algorithm return a (23−z+ǫ)-WSNE, while the
other steps provided the same approximation guarantee as the original algorithm.
So, we can reuse the analysis for the original algorithm to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. There is a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds
a (0.6528 + ǫ)-WSNE using O(n·log nǫ2 ) payoff queries.
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5 A communication efficient algorithm for finding a(
3−
√
5
2
+ ǫ
)
-NE
The algorithm. We will study the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be the
value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality assume
that vc ≤ vr.
– If vr ≤ 3−
√
5
2 , return (xˆ,y
∗).
2. Otherwise:
– Let j be a best response for the column player against x∗.
– Let r be a best response for the row player against j.
– Define the strategy profile x′ = 12−vr · x∗ + 1−vr2−vr · r.
– Return (x′, j).
We show that this algorithm always produces a 3−
√
5
2 -NE. We start by con-
sidering the strategy profile returned by Step 3. The maximum payoff that the
row player can achieve against y∗ is vr, so the row player’s regret can be at most
vr. Similarly, the maximum payoff that the column layer can achieve against xˆ
is vc ≤ vr, so the column player’s regret can be at most vr. Step 3 only returns
a strategy profile in the case where vr ≤ 3−
√
5
2 , so this step always produces a
3−
√
5
2 -NE.
To analyse the quality of approximate equilibrium found by Step 2, we use
the following Lemma.
Lemma 6. The strategy profile (x′, j) is a 1−vr2−vr -NE.
Proof. We start by analysing the regret of the row player. By definition, row
r is a best response against column j. So, the regret of the row player can be
expressed as:
Rrj − (x′ ·R)j = Rrj − 1
2− vR · ((x
∗)T ·R)j − 1− vR
2− vR ·Rrj
≤ 1
2− vR ·Rrj −
1
2− vR · vR
≤ 1
2− vR · 1−
1
2− vR · vr
=
1− vR
2− vR ,
where in the first inequality we use the fact that x∗ is a min-max strategy that
secures payoff at least vr, and the second inequality uses the fact that Rrj ≤ 1.
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We now analyse the regret of the column player. Let c be a best response for
the column player against x′. The regret of the column player can be expressed
as:
((x′)T · C)c − ((x′)T · C)j
=
1
2− vR · ((x
∗)T · C)c + 1− vR
2− vR · Crc −
1
2− vR · ((x
∗)T · C)x∗j − 1− vR
2− vR · Crj
≤ 1− vR
2− vR · Crc −
1− vR
2− vR · Crj
≤ 1− vR
2− vR .
The first inequality holds since j is a best response against x∗ , and therefore
((x∗)T · C)c ≤ (x∗)T · C)j , and the second inequality holds since Crc ≤ 1 and
Crj ≥ 0. Thus, we have shown that both players have regret at most 1−vr2−vr under
(x′, j), and therefore (x′, j) is a 1−vr2−vr -NE. ⊓⊔
Step 2 is only triggered in the case where vr >
3−
√
5
2 , and we have that
1−vr
2−vr =
3−
√
5
2 when vr =
3−
√
5
2 . Since
1−vr
2−vr decreases as vr increases, we therefore have
that Step 2 always produces a 3−
√
5
2 -NE. This completes the proof of correctness
for the algorithm.
Communication complexity. We now argue that, for every ǫ > 0 the algo-
rithm can be used to find a
(
3−
√
5
2 + ǫ
)
-NE using O
(
log2 n
ǫ2
)
rounds of commu-
nication.
We begin by considering Step 3. Obviously, the zero-sum games can be solved
by the two players independently without any communication. Then, the players
exchange vr and vc using O(log n) rounds of communication. If both vr and vc are
smaller than 3−
√
5
2 , then the algorithm from Lemma 1 is applied to communicate
xˆs to the row player, and y
∗
s to the column player. Since the payoffs under
the sampled strategies are within ǫ of the originals, we have that (xˆs,y
∗
s) is a(
3−
√
5
2 + ǫ
)
-NE.
If the algorithm reaches Step 2, then the row player uses the algorithm of
Lemma 1 to communicate x∗s to the column player. The column player then
computes a best response js against x
∗
s , and uses logn communication rounds
to transmit it to the row player. The row player then computes a best response
rs against js, then computes: x
′
s =
1
2−vr · x∗s + 1−vr2−vr · r, and the players output
(x′s, js). To see that this produces a
(
3−
√
5
2 + ǫ
)
-NE, observe that x∗s secures a
payoff of at least vr − ǫ for the row player, and repeating the proof of Lemma 6
with this weaker inequality gives that this strategy profile is a
(
1−vr
2−vr + ǫ
)
-NE.
Therefore, we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For every ǫ > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time
algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
ǫ2
)
communication and finds a
(
3−
√
5
2 + ǫ
)
-NE.
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6 Lower bounds
Consider the following game.
❅
❅
I
II
t
s
b r
0 1
1 0.9
2
3 0.9
0 23
In the game (R,−R), the unique Nash equilibrium is (b, l), which can be
found by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Similarly, in the game
(−C,C), the unique Nash equilibrium is (b, r), which can again be found by
elimination of dominated strategies. Note, however, that the game itself does
not contain any dominated strategies. Hence, we have vR = vC =
2
3 , so Step 2 is
triggered, and the resulting strategy profile is (b, l). Under this strategy profile,
the column player receives payoff 0, while the best response payoff to the column
player is 23 , so this is a
2
3 -WSNE and no better.
This lower bound can be modified to work against our algorithm for finding a
0.6528-WSNE by changing both 23 payoffs to 0.6528. Then, by the same reasoning
given above, Step 2 is triggered, and the algorithm returns a 0.6528-WSNE.
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A A communication efficient algorithm for finding a
0.5-WSNE in a win-lose bimatrix game (proof of
Theorem 1)
We will study the following simple modification of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 4
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be the
value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality assume
that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 0.5, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj · x∗ ≤ 0.5, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
– Let j∗ be a pure best response to x∗.
– Find a row i such that Rij∗ = 1 and Cij = 1.
– Return (i, j∗).
We will show that this algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose
game. Firstly, we show that the pure Nash equilibrium found in Step 4 always
exists. The following lemma is similar to Lemma 3, but exploits the fact that
the game is win-lose to obtain a stronger conclusion.
Lemma 7. If Algorithm 4 is applied to a win-lose game, and it reaches Step 4,
then then there exists a row i ∈ supp(x∗) such that Rij∗ = 1 and Cij∗ = 1.
Proof. Let i be a row sampled from x∗. We will show that there is a positive
probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(Rij∗ = 0) < 0.5. Let the
random variable T = 1 − Rij∗ . Since vr > 12 , we have that E[T ] < 0.5. Thus,
applying Markov’s inequality we obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 1) ≤ E[T ]
1
< 0.5.
Since Pr(Rij∗ = 0) = Pr(T ≥ 1) we can therefore conclude that Pr(Rij∗ = 0) <
0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(Cij∗ = 0) < 0.5, by
using the fact that CTj∗ · x∗ > 0.5.
We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Pr(Rij∗ = 0 or Cij∗ = 0) < 1.
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies Rij∗ > 0 and Cij∗ > 0,
so such a row must exist. The final step is to observe that, since the game is
win-lose, we have that Rij∗ > 0 implies Rij∗ = 1, and that Cij∗ > 0 implies
Cij∗ = 1. ⊓⊔
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We now prove that the algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE. The reasoning is
very similar to the analysis of the base algorithm. The strategy profiles returned
by Steps 2 and 3 are 0.5-WSNEs by the same reasoning that was given for the
base algorithm. Step 4 always returns a pure Nash equilibrium.
Communication complexity. We now show that Algorithm 4 can be imple-
mented in a communication efficient way.
The zero-sum games in Step 1 can be solved by the two players indepen-
dently without any communication. Then, the players exchange vr and vs using
O(log n) rounds of communication. If both vr and vs are smaller than 0.5, then
the algorithm from Lemma 1 is applied to communicate xˆs to the row player,
and y∗s to the column player. Since the payoffs under the sampled strategies are
within ǫ of the originals, we have that all pure strategies have payoff less than
or equal to 0.5 + ǫ under (xˆs,y
∗
s), so this strategy profile is a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE.
We will assume from now on that vr > vc. If the algorithm reaches Step 3,
then the row player uses the algorithm of Lemma 1 to communicate x∗s to the
column player. The column player then computes a best response j∗s against x
∗
s ,
and checks whether the payoff of j∗s against x
∗
s is less than or equal to 0.5+ ǫ. If
so, then the players output (x∗s , j
∗
s), which is a 0.5 + ǫ-WSNE
Otherwise, we claim that there is a pure strategy i ∈ supp(x∗s) such that (i, j∗s)
is a pure Nash equilibrium. This can be shown by observing that the expected
payoff of x∗s against j
∗
s is at least 0.5− ǫ, while the expected payoff of j∗s against
x∗s is at least 0.5 + ǫ. Repeating the proof of Lemma 7 using these inequalities
then shows that the pure Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. Since supp(x∗s)
has logarithmic size, the row player can simply transmit to the column player all
payoffs Rij∗
s
for which i ∈ supp(x∗s), and the column player can then send back
a row corresponding to a pure Nash equilibrium.
In conclusion, we have shown that a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE can be found in ran-
domized expected-polynomial-time using O
(
log2 n
ǫ2
)
communication, which com-
pletes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Lemma 4
In this section we assume that Steps 1 through 4 of our algorithm did not return
a (23 − z)-WSNE, and that neither j∗ nor j′ contained a pure (23 − z)-WSNE.
We show that, under these assumptions, the rows b and s required by Step 5 do
indeed exist.
Probability bounds. We begin by proving bounds on the amount of proba-
bility that x∗ can place on S and B. The following lemma uses the fact that
x∗ secures an expected payoff of at least 23 − z to give an upper bound on the
amount of probability that x∗ can place on S. To simplify notation, we use Pr(B)
to denote the probability assigned by x∗ to the rows in B, and we use Pr(S) to
denote the probability assigned by x∗ to the rows in S.
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Lemma 8. Pr(S) ≤ 1+3z2−3z .
Proof. We will prove our claim using Markov’s inequality. Consider the random
variable T = 1− Rij∗ where i is sampled from x∗. Since by our assumption the
expected payoff of the row player is greater than 2/3 − z we get that E(T ) ≤
1/3 + z. If we apply Markov’s inequality we get
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) ≤ E(T )2
3 − z
≤ 1 + 3z
2− 3z
which is the claimed result. ⊓⊔
Next we show an upper bound on Pr(B). Here we use the fact that j∗ does
not contain a (23 − z)-WSNE to argue that all column player payoffs in B are
smaller than 13 + z. Since we know that the payoff of j
∗ against x∗ is at least
2
3 − z, this can be used to prove a upper bound on the amount of probability
that x∗ assigns to B.
Lemma 9. Pr(B) ≤ 1+3z2−3z .
Proof. Since there is no i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j∗) is a pure (23 − z)-WSNE ,
and since each row i ∈ B satisfies Rij∗ ≥ 13 + z, we must have that Cij∗ < 13 + z
for every i ∈ B. By assumption we know that CTj∗x∗ > 2/3− z. So, we have the
following inequality:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (1
3
+ z) +
(
1− Pr(B)) · 1.
Solving this inequality for Pr(B) gives the desired result. ⊓⊔
Payoff inequalities for j∗. We now show properties about the average payoff
obtained from the rows in B and S. Recall that xb was defined in Step 4 of our
algorithm, and that it denotes the normalization of the probability mass assigned
by x∗ to rows in B. The following lemma shows that the expected payoff to the
row player in the strategy profile (xb, j
∗) is close to 1.
Lemma 10. We have (xb
T · R)j∗ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof. By definition we have that:
(xb
T ·R)j∗ = 1
Pr(B)
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ . (1)
We begin by deriving a lower bound for
∑
i∈B x
∗
i · Rij∗ . Using the fact that x∗
secures an expected payoff of at least 2/3− z against j∗ and then applying the
bound from Lemma 8 gives:
2
3
− z <
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · Pr(S)
≤
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
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Hence we can conclude that:
∑
i∈B
x∗i · Rij∗ >
2
3
− z − 1
3
· (1 + 3z)
2
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
2− 3z .
Substituting this into Equation (1), along with the upper bound on Pr(B) from
Lemma 9, allows us to conclude that:
(xb
T · R)j∗ ≥ 2− 3z
1 + 3z
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i · Rij∗
>
2− 3z
1 + 3z
· 1− 6z
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
⊓⊔
Next we would like to show a similar bound on the expected payoff to the
column player of the rows in S. To do this, we define xs to be the normalisation
of the probability mass that x∗ assigns to the rows in S. More formally, for each
i ∈ [n], we define:
(xs)i =
{
1
Pr(S) · x∗i if i ∈ S
0 otherwise.
The next lemma shows that the expected payoff to the column player in the
profile (xs, j
∗) is close to 1.
Lemma 11. We have (xs
T · C)j∗ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof. By definition we have that:
(xs
T · C)j∗ = 1
Pr(S)
·
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ . (2)
We begin by deriving a lower bound for
∑
i∈S x
∗
i ·Cij∗ . By assumption, we know
that CTj∗x
∗ > 2/3− z. Moreover, since j∗ does not contain a (23 − z)-WSNE we
have that all rows i in B satisfy Cij∗ < 1/3− z. If we combine these facts that
with Lemma 9 we obtain:
2
3
− z <
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · Pr(B)
≤
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
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Hence we can conclude that:∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ >
2
3
− z − 1
3
· (1 + 3z)
2
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
2− 3z .
Substituting this into Equation (2), along with the upper bound on Pr(S) from
Lemma 9, allows us to conclude that:
(xb
T · R)j∗ ≥ 2− 3z
1 + 3z
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i · Rij∗
>
2− 3z
1 + 3z
· 1− 6z
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
⊓⊔
Payoff inequalities for j′. We now want to prove similar inequalities for the
column j′. The next lemma shows that the expected payoff for the column player
in the profile (xb, j
′) is close to 1. This is achieved by first showing a lower bound
on the payoff to the column player in the profile (xb, j
∗), and then using the fact
that j∗ is not a (23 − z)-best-response against xb, and that j′ is a best response
against xb.
Lemma 12. We have (xb
T · C)j′ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof. We first establish a lower bound on (xb
T ·C)j∗ . By assumption, we know
that CTj∗x
∗ > 2/3 − z. Using this fact, along with the bounds from Lemmas 8
and 9 gives:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (xbT · C)j∗ + Pr(S) · 1
≤ 1 + 3z
2− 3z · (xb
T · C)j∗ + 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
Solving this inequality for (xb
T · C)j∗ yields:
(xb
T · C)j∗ > 1
3
· 1− 21z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
.
Now we can prove the lower bound on (xb
T · C)j′ . Since j∗ is not a (23 − z)-
best-response against xb, and since j
′ is a best response against xb we obtain:
(xb
T · C)j′ > (xbT · C)j∗ + 2
3
− z
(xb
T · C)j′ > 1
3
· 1− 21z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
+
2
3
− z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
⊓⊔
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The only remaining inequality that we require is a lower bound on the ex-
pected payoff to the row player in the profile (xs, j
′). However, before we can
do this, we must first prove an upper bound on the expected payoff to the row
player in (xb, j
′), which we do in the following lemma. Here we first prove that
most of the probability mass of xb is placed on rows i in which Cij′ >
1
3 + z,
which when combined with the fact that there is no i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j′)
is a pure (23 − z)-WSNE, is sufficient to provide an upper bound.
Lemma 13. We have (xb
T · R)j′ < 13 · 1+33z+9z
2
1+3z .
Proof. We begin by proving an upper bound on the amount of probability mass
assigned by xb to rows i with Cij′ <
1
3+z. Let T = 1−Cij′ be a random variable
where the row i is sampled according to xb. Lemma 12 implies that:
E[T ] = 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
Observe that Pr(T ≥ 1 − (13 + z)) = Pr(T ≥ 23 − z) is equal to the amount
of probability that xb assigns to rows i with Cij′ <
1
3 + z. Applying Markov’s
inequality then establishes our bound.
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) ≤
9z
1+3z
2
3 − z
.
So, if p = 9z(1+3z)(2/3−z) then we know that at least 1−p probability is assigned
by xb to rows i such that Cij′ >
1
3 + z. Since we have assumed that there is no
i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j′) is a pure (23 − z)-WSNE, we know that any such
row i must satisfy Rij′ <
1
3 + z. Hence, we obtain the following bound:
(xb
T ·R)j′ < (1 − p) · (1
3
+ z) + p
=
1
3
· 1 + 33z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
.
⊓⊔
Finally, we show that the expected payoff to the row player in the profile
(xs, j
′) is close to 1. Here we use the fact that x∗ is a min-max strategy along
with the bound from Lemma 13 to prove our lower bound.
Lemma 14. We have (xs
T · R)j′ > 1−15z1+3z .
Proof. Since x∗ is a min-max strategy that secures a value strictly larger than
2
3 − z, we have:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (xbT · R)j′ + Pr(S) · (xsT · R)j′ .
Substituting the bounds from Lemmas 8, 9, and 13 then gives:
2
3
− z < 1 + 3z
2− 3z ·
1
3
· 1 + 33z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
+
1 + 3z
2− 3z · (xs
T ·R)j′ .
Solving for (xs
T · R)j′ then yields the desired result. ⊓⊔
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Finding rows b and u. So far, we have shown that the expected payoff to the
row player in (xb, j
∗) is close to 1, and that the expected payoff to the column
player in (xb, j
′) is close to 1. We now show that there exists a row b ∈ B such
that Rbj∗ is close to 1, and Cbj′ is close to 1, and that there exists a row s ∈ S
in which Csj∗ and Rsj′ are both close to 1. The following lemma uses Markov’s
inequality to show a pair of probability bounds that will be critical in showing
the existence of b.
Lemma 15. We have:
– xb assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with Rij∗ > 1− 18z1+3z .
– xb assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with Cij′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
Proof. We begin with the first case. Consider the random variable T = 1−Rij∗
where i is sampled from xb. By Lemma 10, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 18z1+3z whenever Rij∗ ≤ 1 − 18z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 18z
1 + 3z
) <
9z
1+3z
18z
1+3z
= 0.5.
The proof of the second case is identical to the proof given above, but uses
the (identical) bound from Lemma 12. ⊓⊔
The next lemma uses the same techniques to prove a pair of probability
bounds that will be used to prove the existence of s.
Lemma 16. We have:
– xs assigns strictly more than
1
3 probability to rows i with Cij∗ > 1− 27z1+3z .
– xs assigns strictly more than
2
3 probability to rows i with Rij′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
Proof. We begin with the first claim. Consider the random variable T = 1−Cij∗
where i is sampled from xs. By Lemma 11, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 27z1+3z whenever Cij∗ ≤ 1 − 27z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 27z
1 + 3z
) <
9z
1+3z
27z
1+3z
=
1
3
.
We now move on to the second claim. Consider the random variable T =
1−Rij∗ where i is sampled from xb. By Lemma 14, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 15z
1 + 3z
=
18z
1 + 3z
.
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria 27
We have that T ≥ 27z1+3z whenever Rij∗ ≤ 1 − 27z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 27z
1 + 3z
) <
18z
1+3z
27z
1+3z
=
2
3
.
⊓⊔
Finally, we can formally prove the existence of b and s, which completes the
proof of correctness for our algorithm.
Proof (of Lemma 4). We begin by proving the first claim. If we sample a row b
randomly from xb, then Lemma 15 implies that probability that Rbj∗ ≤ 1− 18z1+3z
is strictly less than 0.5 and that the probability that Cbj′ ≤ 1− 18z1+3z is strictly
less than 0.5. Hence, by the union bound, the probability that at least one of
these events occurs is strictly less than 1. So, there is a positive probability that
neither of the events occurs, which implies that there exists at least one row b
that satisfies the desired properties.
The second claim is proved using exactly the same technique, but using the
bounds from Lemma 16, again observing that the probability that a randomly
sampled row from xs satisfies the desired properties with positive probability.
⊓⊔
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
